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Giving in Dictator Games
Traditionally, giving in dictator games was assumed to signal preferences over others' payoffs. To date, several studies find that dictator game giving breaks down under conditions designed to increase dictators' anonymity or if an option to take money obscures the purpose of the task. Giving is therefore argued to result from an experimenter demand effect. Here, we put this new interpretation to a stress test and find evidence that dictators mean to compensate the recipient for her vulnerable position in the game. Our results explain why giving decreases under specific conditions designed to increase anonymity and why the same individual may signal very different other-regarding preferences across different rules and/or roles of a game (Blanco et al. 2011 ).
Introduction
Recently, giving in dictator games has been fundamentally reinterpreted. Initially taken as evidence for an individual preference over others' payoffs, it is nowadays argued to be the result of an experimenter demand effect (Smith 2010; Oechssler 2010; Zizzo 2010; Zizzo 2011; Franzen and Pointner 2012) . The first interpretation implies that there is a substantial body of evidence at odds with economics' central assumption of individual self-interest which has inspired new models of preferences. The second interpretation implies that the evidence is an artefact of the method by which it was collected.
Here, we quantify the sensitivity of individual giving to various demand effects, analyze the stability of one and the same individuals' transfers across all interventions, and throughout, study individuals' motivations to give. We find the same result for all belief conditions: Giving strongly increases in the extent to which subjects' normative ideals are violated by the rules of the game. Specifically the rules of a dictator game deny the recipient any right of voice or veto, i.e. any right to state her own will. Such a motivation can explain why the same individual may show very different other regarding behaviour across different games (Blanco et al. 2011 ) (because the rules of one game are deemed unjust whereas the rules of another are not) or in different roles of the same game, or why subjects transfer nothing if they must make use of a random device in their decision 1 (Franzen and Pointner 2012) (because the compensation for the rules of the game seems to depend on a stochastic element).
The dictator game is a very simple situation: a proposer is asked to split a pie between herself and a recipient. The recipient has no veto, and if proposer and recipient are anonymous, whatever amount a proposer transfers cannot be motivated by a strategic concern about her own payoff. The situation seems an easy one which subjects are not likely to misunderstand. Therefore, it was assumed that any proposer who gives money to the recipient must derive utility from increasing the recipient's payoff. Hence, giving in dictator games was taken for very clean evidence against mere self-interest. However, a dictator game is also a very unusual situation: [...]"You are recruited to the lab, awarded
1 The random draw was imposed to hide intended transfers from the experimenter.
1 a costless right to some of the experimenter's money, and given an opportunity to transfer any part or none of it to a second anonymous person who has nothing to do except receive the money. [...] "The God's must be crazy!" [...] (Smith 2010, p. 9) A subject might try to make sense of the situation by implicitely assuming that there will be (any) repeated interaction, and/or might think that the experimental task is about giving and that she is supposed to comply with this request, or still, she might think the experimenter kind and reciprocate this kindness by acting as she supposes she is desired to act.
Our starting point are the puzzling results of John A. List (2007) and Nick Bardsley (2008) who find that dictators start to take away money from a recipient if given the option. The reception of their finding was that dictators who face 'Take' options cannot unanimously infer and therefore comply with what the experimenter supposes them to do, that dictators who only face 'Give' options do not seriously think about not giving anything, or that alternatively/additionally, giving is reference-dependent. We design sequences of traditional 'Give' and the newly designed 'Take' dictator games to shift subjects' beliefs about the task and analyze subjects' transfers along (within-subjects) and across (betweensubjects) these sequences. If subjects' first game in the experiment offers only 'Give' options, very few subjects transfer stable amounts in the remainder of the sequence. If subjects first game included 'Give' and 'Take' options, twice as many do. The effect of shifting beliefs about the task is yet not sufficient to explain the difference in transfers between 'Give' and 'Take' games. Instead, much of it is due to Bardsley's suspicion of a reference dependency since we find many dictators who transfer the same difference to the most selfish option across 'Give' and 'Take' games. In general, giving is much more often absolutely stable (i.e. neither reference dependent nor inconsistent), if subjects have right from the outset options to 'Give' and to 'Take'.
We find that, always, (and not only in the case of individually stable transfers) dictators' moral motivations to give stay the same in our experiment:
transfers increase in the degree to which the respect of others' freedom of choice or others' will is a moral imperative to the dictator. This type of argument refers to the rules of the game rather than their outcome 2 . Section 2 presents our experimental design, section 3 our results and a detailed analysis of stability in the transfers we observe, section 4 presents our analysis of subjects' motivation in transferring money, and section 5 concludes.
2 Preferences purely over the rules of the game have only recently been studied in economics (Frey and Stutzer 2005) , (Chlaß et al. 2009 ), (Shor 2009 ), (Chlaß 2010) , (Mertins 2010) .
Controversy
Zizzo (2010) suspects that giving in dictator games is subject to two types of experimenter demand effects (EDEs). The first is of a social nature in that dictators react to the experimenter's authority -i.e. students give more when the experimenter is a professor than when the experimenter is unknown (Brañas-Garza 2007) . There is less giving in double-blind settings (Hoffmann et al. 1994) or when giving can otherwise be hidden from the experimenter (Franzen and Pointner 2012) but still, there is giving 3 . Moreover, Zizzo (2010) and Smith (2010) argue that dictator game giving can result from a second, i.e. a purely cognitive demand effect. Subjects who try to make sense of the 'unfamiliar', 'incompletely defined' environment use the available cues (instructions, feedback)
to find out what the experiment is about and conform by giving. Zizzo (2010) illustrates this effect by List's (2007) and Bardsley's (2008) finding that adding a 'Take' option to a dictator game in a completely anonymous double-blind setting can reverse average giving into taking. Clearly, subjects who face a 'Take' game can less easily form a definite idea about what the experiment is about, or what the experimenter supposes them to do.
Another artefact in dictator games is that the money to be distributed typically falls like 'manna from heaven' (Engel 2011) which makes the cost of giving unrealistically small. Cherry et al. (2002) show that when subjects must earn the money first, individual giving reduces strongly 4 . It seems that a realistic cost (45 minutes of answering a quiz yielded $40) of giving might already overweigh the potential moral cost from not giving (Levitt and List 2007) . Contrary to Zizzo (2010) , List (2007) explains his finding on average taking in a 'Take'-game' by precisely the fact that giving has become relatively more costly in view of the newly available option to take.
Finally, a dictator game is unarguably a highly artifical situation (Smith 3 Zizzo points out that it is not yet clear whether this decrease in double-blind settings or Franzen and Pointner's (2012) random devices results from a reverse demand effect informing subjects that they are expected not to give anything (Zizzo 2010) .
4 Unfortunately, only the dictators must earn money in (Cherry et al. 2002) . In traditional dictator games, however, both parties are on an equal footing at the outset of the experiment. A dictator can see the fact that the recipient is spared any work as being equivalent to a transfer. 2010; Zizzo 2010) which might confuse subjects despite its simplicity and make them heavily dependent on further informational cues. Therefore, behaviour may react to any (Oechssler 2010) small changes in the experimental design, such as frames (Brañas-Garza 2006) , or arbitrary pieces of information on the recipient (Burnham 2003) . Levati et al. (2011) point out that a subject might need to have a meaningful alternative situation (i.e. a dictator game and a trust game to understand that in a trust game, there is room for reciprocity while in a dictator game, there is not) to understand a dictator game properly and thus, to have the same model of the experimental task as the experimenter. It seems that most of the controversy would be solved if one were to understand positively what giving in dictator games is really about. In this paper, we do find a positive explanation for dictator game giving which holds for 'Give' and 'Take' games. Next, we comment on our experimental design by which we try to assess many of the arguments pointed out above.
Experimental Design
Subjects. The computerized experiment was run in the laboratory of the Chair for empirical and experimental economics at the Friedrich Schiller University, Jena. Subjects were undergraduate students recruited via ORSEE (Greiner 2004 ) and randomly drawn from various fields of study. Altogether, 215 dictators participated in our experiment. Two sucessful pilots were run to ensure the maturity of the software and the instructions. Altogether we have 6 sessions with 18 participants per treatment, i.e. 54 dictators per treatment 5 . A session lasted approximately 45 minutes.
General Experimental Procedure. The laboratory opened 30 minutes before a scheduled session. As soon as a subject arrived she drew a seat number and was randomly seated in a visually isolated computer cabin. Subjects were instructed to wait quietly in their cabins until the experiment started. There was no interaction of subjects before the experiment started. We proceeded this way to ensure as much anonymity between subjects as possible 6 . Students knew that 5 In one out of 24 sessions, our server crashed and the experiment needed to be interrupted. This session was repeated and the crashed session was excluded from the analysis 6 It happened four times that subjects arrived at the same time. Otherwise, all subjects arrived at distinct points of time but could see each others' backs. 4 their decisions were anonymous. At the time scheduled for the experiment, the same experimenter announced in every session that the experiment would start.
Instructions were distributed which told subjects to click on an OK-button when they had carefully read them. Subsequently, all subjects answered the same control questions to ensure they had understood the instructions. Once all subjects had correctly answered these questions, subjects were randomly divided into dictators and recipients. During the experiment, the experimenters were seated in a separate cabin. In a perfect stranger design, subjects would play one out of two possible sequences of List's (2007) and Bardsley's (2008) 'Give' and 'Take-5' dictator games. In a 'Give' dictator game, subjects receive Treatment 'GTGT'. Treatment 'GTGT' was designed to analyze a potential cognitive experimenter effect within-subjects and started out with a 'Give' dictator game. Dictators and recipients had an initial endowment of 5 ECU.
Dictators were asked to split a pie of additional 5 Experimental Currency Units (4 €) between themselves and an anonymous recipient. Then, dictators were rematched with another anonymous recipient, and unexpectedly played a 'Take-5' dictator game. If a dictator had in the first game formed the belief that the experiment analyzes giving, she may revise that belief in the subsequent 'Take-5' game. The 'Give' game after the unexpected 'Take' game reveals her giving after the revision of her belief. To sum up, in treatment 'GTGT' subjects play the following sequence of games: 'Give', 'Take-5', 'Give', 'Take-5' 9 .
Treatment 'TGTG'. Treatment 'TGTG' started out with a 'Take-5' dictator 7 We merely wanted to avoid frustrating recipients and do not analyse their data here. 8 App. 2 reproduces an excerpt of the test with kind permission by the author. 9 We repeated both types of games to additionally check the robustness of transfers to a repetition of the same game. Subjects therefore always play four rounds (and not three).
game. Dictators were asked to split a pie of 5 Experimental Currency Units (4 €) between themselves and an anonymous recipient and were told that they could also give negative amounts, i.e. take away up to the entire endowment of the recipient. Then, a 'Give' dictator game followed and subsequently, both games were repeated. In treatment 'TGTG' subjects therefore played the sequence: 'Take-5', 'Give', ' Take Treatments 'GTGT/TGTG Earned Income'. List (2007) complements his study by two 'earnings' treatments where dictators and responders have to earn the endowment and the pie in a 30 minutes task of sorting mail for a charitable fund raiser. We also performed two such treatments but were concerned to choose a 'morally neutral' task such that dictators would not be discouraged from taking by thinking that the responder had worked for a 'good purpose' and should therefore be rewarded. We gave subjects a fixed task to complete which lasted approximately 30 minutes. It was common knowledge that all subjects had to complete the same type of task. First, all subjects had to build altogether 30 sums of four one digit and one two-digit numbers which lasted approximately 10 minutes. Second, subjects counted the number of Ones in sixty 5x5 matrices which lasted approximately 12 minutes (Prömpers 2009) , and finally, subjects were asked to set 50 sliders to the value of 50 which lasted further 7 to 8 minutes. We opted for various tasks to avoid boring subjects. After the earning stage, subjects were randomly divided into dictators and recipients and either played the sequence 'GTGT', or 'TGTG', respectively.
Payment. It was common knowledge that subjects would be paid only for one out of the four rounds they played (one 'round' is equal to one game). At the very end of the experiment the computer drew with equal probability one out of four rounds (games) and subjects were informed about their respective payment on their computer screens. On their screens subjects were told to wait quietly in their cabins until their cabin number would be called. Subjects left the laboratory one by one when their cabin number was announced and received their payment in an envelope at the exit of the laboratory. Thus, we avoided there being any interaction after the experiment. Figs. 1 show the difference in transfers between 'Give' and 'Take-5' Games between subjects as in (List 2007 ) and (Bardsley 2008) which means using only data from the first round. Giving differs across both games, i.e. across the first round of treatment 'GTGT' and the first round of treatment 'TGTG'. In 'Give' dictator games where subjects can only choose between zero or positive transfers subjects give average positive amounts. The average is slightly higher when money falls like 'manna from heaven', i.e. 1.38 ECU, than when subjects have to earn it, i.e. 1.27 ECU. In 'Take' games instead, the average transfer is negative. It is less negative for 'manna from heaven', i.e. -0.09 ECU than for 'Earned Income', i.e. -0.52 ECU. Significantly more subjects give positive amounts in 'Give' games than in 'Take'-games (One-sided Fisher's exact test, 'manna from heaven': p ă 0.03, 'Earned Income': p ă 0.02.)
Figure 1: Giving in Give and Take-Games. Violin plots (Hintze et al. 1998) show the distribution (grey), the interquartile range (thick black line) and the average (white dot) of transfers. Similarly to List (2007) and Bardsley (2008) , we observe an average downward shift in transfers across 'Give' and 'Take' games and find significant less positive transfers in 'Take' games. Next, we try to explain this average downward shift by a shift in subjects' beliefs about the purpose of the experiment. 
Giving prior to and after Take-5 Games
A subject who starts out with a 'Give' game (treatment 'GTGT') may believe that the experiment is about 'giving'. She might conclude that the experimenter 'supposes' or 'desires' her to transfer something to a recipient. If, in a second round, she unexpectedly faces a 'Take-5' game, she may revise her belief about the purpose of the experiment and about what she is supposed to do. If giving is sensitive to such beliefs, transfers in a 'Give' game prior to and after a 'Take-5' game should differ.
Figs. 2a-b show the distribution of transfers in subjects' first 'Give' game prior to and after a 'Take' game between subjects. Thereby, transfers in the first round of treatment 'GTGT' are compared to transfers in the second round of treatment 'TGTG'. Indeed, subjects' average transfers seem to be smaller in the first 'Give' game after a 'Take-5' game ('manna from heaven': 1.25 ECU, Earned Income: 0.91 ECU) than in the first 'Give' game prior to a 'Take-5' game ('manna from heaven': 1.38 ECU, 'Earned Income': 1.27 ECU). The difference is visibly larger 8 when subjects distribute earned income (Fig. 2b) , rather than 'manna from heaven' (Fig 2a) . When income is earned, the distribution (except for the maximum) homogeneously shifts downward. There are weakly significantly more zero transfers 'after Take' than 'prior to Take' (One sided Fisher's exact test, p ă 0.10) 10 . It is therefore possible that some subjects do indeed not seriously consider giving nothing when asked to split a pie between themselves and an anonymous recipient if only 'Give' options are available. When 'manna falls from heaven', the difference is more heterogeneous and a part of the distribution even increases (the 25% highest transfers 'after Take' exceed the 25% highest transfers 'prior to Take'). Overall, the shifts from 
Are Individual Preferences for Giving stable?
i) Giving across 'Give' and 'Take' games. Here, we study to what extent a subject can give a positive amount in a 'Give' game and a negative amount in a 'Take' game and still have a stable preference for giving.
In a 'Take'-game the experimenter provides dictator and recipient with an endowment which the dictator can later on take away. In addition, the experimenter also provides a 'pie' and assumes that dictators will differentiate between pie and endowment. However, a dictator might also think that the overall pie is the amount they are empowered to decide about, i.e. the recipient's endowment plus the amount termed 'pie'. If so, a dictator transfers a positive amount in a 'Give' game, a negative amount in a 'Take' game, but the same absolute difference to the minimum across both games. This minimum is Zero in a 'Give' but´5 in a 'Take' game. A transfer of 2 ECU in the first differs by the same amount from the minimum as taking away 3 ECU in the latter, i.e.
10 Within-subjects, average transfers prior to and after Take are 1.38 ECU (Earnings: 1.27 ECU) and 1.05 ECU (Earnings: 1.11 ECU), respectively. Five (Earnings: 4) more subjects offer Zero in their second 'Give' game than in the first, and the most frequent change in transfers was to offer 0.5 ECU less (Earnings: -1 ECU and -0.5 ECU) than before.
´3´p´5q " 2 ECU
11 . Similarly, a dictator could give the same relative share of the pie plus the recipient's endowment, but note that for minimum transfers, types coincide. Table 1 shows how many transfers classify as either type. For same relative share transfers, we only report transfers which exclusively classify as such. Starting out with a traditional 'Give' game, subjects make significantly less stable choices across 'Give' and 'Take' games than after starting out with a 'Take' game (one-sided Fisher's exact test, p ă 0.03). This is essentially due to a loss in absolute stability: only 7% of all 54 subjects transfer the same absolute amount across the first 'Give' and 'Take' game. If subjects start out with a 'Take' game instead, 35% transfer an absolutely stable amount, a similar share as in all other treatments. The share of subjects who transfer the same absolute difference to the minimum ranges between 17% and 24% and varies but a little between treatments. There are only seven cases (i.e. the sum of the number in the third row of In contrast, dictators who give the same absolute difference to the minimum nearly always (40 out of altogether 44 dictators) choose the strict minimum in both games. The seven dictators who exclusively classify as same relative share mostly offer an equal split which implies a transfer of 2.5 ECU in a 'Give' game, and a transfer of 0 ECU in a 'Take' game. In summary, 51% of all stable transfers across 'Give' and 'Take' games within a 99% confidence interval of r38.4%, 63.2%s are non-minimum transfers. Alarmingly, transfers from classic 'Give' dictator games are least robust to a subsequent 'Take' frame.
ii) Giving across the same type of games. How many subjects give the same amount in the first and second game despite potential shifts in beliefs about the experimental task? Table 2 shows how many subjects give the same amount, or less in the second 'Give' ('Take') game depending on whether they start out with a 'Give' game (treatment 'GTGT') or with a 'Take' game (treatment 'TGTG'). How much do dictators who give the same amount in both 'Give' ('Take') games, transfer? Take Fig. 3a . which depicts all treatments where 'manna falls from heaven'. Specifically for treatment 'GTGT' which starts out with a 'Give' game we expect that some dictators revise both their belief about the shows that specifically high transfers in traditional 'Give' games are not robust after the unexpected experience of a 'Take' game whereas a broader range of transfers is stable when subjects start right out with a 'Take' game. Turning to 'Take' games, the effect is even more visible. In treatment 'GTGT' depicted by violin b), the average stable transfer is the strict minimum of´5: mostly those subjects make stable choices who choose the most selfish outcome. In contrast, the average stable transfer for treatment 'TGTG' in violin d) is Zero, and stable transfers include some 50% positive amounts. Fig. 3b) shows stable transfers for all treatments where money is earned.
We see that a broader interquartile range of transfers is stable in treatment 'GTGT' than in treatment 'TGTG' by comparing violins e) and g). This is due to the fact that in treatment 'Earned Income', subjects transfer overall less, if they start out with a 'Take' rather than a 'Give' game. Giving in 'Take' games differs across treatments 'GTGT' and 'TGTG' merely in the 25% highest transfers as one can see from violins f) and h).
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In this section, we have shown that a substantial share of dictator game giving is stable across 'Give' and 'Take' games, and that a substantial share of giving also resists to experience with the task. In the next section, we focus on tracking down the motivations behind individual giving.
What is giving in dictator games about?
Here, we assess various moral motivations for giving in dictator games to pin down the driving force -if any -behind subjects' transfers. We elicit subjects' preferences over different ways of moral argumentation ("Why do I deem something right or wrong?") by a standardized experimental moral judgment test (Lind 1978 (Lind , 2008 and regress dictators' transfers on these moral preferences. Table 3 reviews the ways of moral argumentation covered by the test which were first systemized by Lawrence Kohlberg (Kohlberg 1984 ) and points out typical arguments which might trigger nonzero transfers in a dictator game. Thereby, each way of argumentation uses specific criteria to come up with a decision whether something is right or wrong. ...an individual's right of democratic participation must be respected, or else be compensated; ... an individual must be free to choose, to state her own will or else be compensated.
Kohlberg specifies three major ways of moral argumentation -a preconventional, a conventional, and a postconventional way with two subclasses each 12 . In the context of our experimental design, merely norm-based, expectation-based (conventional) or postconventional ways of argumentation apply since neither experimenter nor recipient can reward/punish a dictator (preconventional criterion).
Note that conventional moral argumentation may lead to a social experimenter demand effect in that dictators give because they want to fulfill the experimenter's/recipient's expectation or want the experimenter/the recipient in the lab to think them kind. Similarly, a dictator might want to thank the experimenter by 'reciprocating' nonzero amounts to the recipient. The third, i.e.
postconventional type of argumentation is particularly interesting in the setting of a dictator game. Here, one has moral criteria which refer to procedural aspects of a situation, or the rules of the game. Dictators who deem it wrong that the recipient has no right of participation (class1), that the recipient's right to state her own will or her freedom of choice (class 2) is violated may transfer nonzero amounts to compensate the normative infringement. If so, giving in dictator games would not signal an individual preference over others' payoff. Rather, it would signal a purely procedural preference (Chlaß et al. 2009 ), i.e. a concern about a criterion violated by a procedure which is not related to the (expected) outcome of that procedure (Chlaß 2010 ).
We elicit individuals' preferences over preconventional, conventional, and postconventional argumentation via Georg Lind's (1978 Lind's ( -2008 standardized moral judgment test MJT 13 . The test introduces two stories. A first features workers breaking into a factory to steal evidence that a company was listening in on its employees, a second features a woman who is fatally ill and asks her doctor to medically assist her in committing suicide which he grants. In each case, subjects state their preferences over different types of moral arguments which are put forth to either excuse, or condemn the protagonists' behaviour. A postconventional argument would for instance be, that the doctor acts morally right because she carries out the woman's will in her stead when the woman cannot 12 Georg Lind also measures cognitive moral ability which does not predict dictators' transfers.
13 Appendix B provides an excerpt of the English MJT with kind permission by Georg Lind. we analyze subjects' first and second game of the same type separately. 4b. Giving in the second 'Give'-game. Table 4a shows a regression of transfers in the first 'Give' game. The more a subject prefers to argue 'conventionally', i.e. con 1, the less she transfers.
Specifically, it is the first class of conventional arguments from table 3, the moral criterion to be taken for a nice person by either experimenter or recipient which reduces transfers. Instead, the more a subject prefers to argue postconventionally, i.e. post 2, the more she transfers. Specifically the second class of postconventional arguments from seriously, (i) anonymity seems to work in that subjects who care a lot for that others think them kind gave significantly less. Second (ii), dictators who prefer to apply general ethical principles like the respect for others' will etc. transfer persistently more than those who do not. Third (iii), any difference between 'earned money' and 'manna from heaven' fades out with repetition. A potential experimenter demand effect (at least the type which we tried to induce) can therefore be decreased by repetition, and with repetition or earnings, subjects simply make more informed choices.
Tables 5 show similar results for 'Take' games. Again, particularly a preference for postconventional argumentation, i.e. post2, increases transfers.
There are, however, two main differences as compared to 'Give' games above.
First, transfers in subjects' first 'Take' game (table 5a) are significantly higher, if the experiment starts out with a 'Take' game, i.e. ('TGTG'=1), than if it starts with a 'Give' game. Apparently, subjects who started out with a 'Give' game in the belief that we wished to study giving/wished them to transfer positive amounts, are particularly selfish once they see their error. For 'Give' games above, the effect was weaker. The second main difference is about repetition 16 5b. Giving in the second 'Take'-game.
(table 5b). We see that only for male students, i.e. sex=1, the positive effect of postconventional argumentation survives to repetition. As mentioend above, in all four regressions, the main effect can be split into one which does not depend on gender, and one which does. If one repeats a 'Take' game after a 'Give' game, only this second part survives.
Overall, we find strong evidence that individual transfers in subjects' first 'Give' and 'Take' games are strongly related to the second class (post 2 ) of postconventional argumentation which refers to ethical principles such as the respect for others' will, and the respect for others' freedom of choice. The rules of a dictator game violate precisely these principles since the recipient has no freedom of choice at all. While the proposer cannot veto the rules of the game she dislikes, she can compensate the recipient for the moral deficit of these rules -which is precisely what we find.
Conclusion
In two papers which have received much attention, List (2007) and Bardsley (2008) report that, if one adds a 'Take'-option to the traditional dictator game with allows for exclusively nonnegative transfers, average giving in the laboratory turns into average taking. The conclusion that dictator game giving is a laboratory artefact has found increasing support (Oechssler 2010; Smith 2010; Zizzo 2010; Zizzo 2011; Franzen and Pointner 2012) . It is argued that dictators infer from both task and circumstances that the experimenter wishes them to transfer positive amounts. The issue is a fundamental one and boils down to the question whether or not dictator game giving is evidence for other regarding preferences, i.e. preferences over others' payoffs.
In this paper, we quantify the sensitivity of individual giving to demand effects and repetition, and throughout all games, study dictators' motivations to
give. We elicit characteristics of individuals' moral judgment in an experimental psychological test and regress dictator game giving on the characteristics we obtain. We find that dictators' transfers increase in the strength of individuals' preference to assess how an outcome to be judged was brought about. Hence, the more individuals prefer to judge what is just by ethical properties of the rules of a game, the more money individuals transfer to the recipient. Specifically the dictator game denies the recipient any freedom of choice or participation, and does not respect her will. It is intuitive that the rules of the game could trigger such procedural concerns, and a transfer would then be a compensation of these rules, or signal a purely procedural preference.
Our results about the stability of giving under shifts in beliefs about the task and repetitions of the same game are as follows. Each dictator plays a sequence of two 'Give' and 'Take' games. Overall, 141 out of 215 p66%q dictators make the same transfer in a first and second 'Give' game if there is a 'Take' game in between. Starting out with a 'Take' game rather than a 'Give' game does not affect the percentage of stable transfers in the two subsequent traditional 'Give' dictator games. However, it greatly affects the percentage of positive (nonzero) transfers. Only 21% of subjects transfer positive amounts in the two traditional 'Give' dictator games when they started out with a 'Take' game whereas 36% do so starting out with a 'Give' game (thinking that the experiment is about giving). A between-subjects comparison reconfirms the finding: a group which thinks we only study 'Give' games gives significantly more often nonzero amounts in their first 'Give' game than a group who knows that we also study 'Take' options. We analyse the stability in transfers across 'Give' and 'Take' games intraindividually, to find out what drives the prominent average decline in transfers reported by List and Bardsley. Allowing for absolute stability, and stability with respect to the most selfish outcome (i.e.
reference-dependent stability) we find that 112 out of 215 dictators p53%q make stable transfers across 'Give' and 'Take' games whereby 97 (45%) transfer more than the strict minimum. Therefore much of the prominent finding seems to 18 arise from a reference dependency rather than a demand effect. The conditions which yield least stability in choices across 'Give' and 'Take' games are i) the condition where money is not earned, and ii) where subjects start out in the belief that we only study 'Give' games.
Altogether, the belief conditions about the purpose of the task can matter a lot but we always find a significant residual share of dictators who transfer more (and even stably so) than the strict minimum. Despite all variation in transfers we confirm for all dictator games and all sequences one and the same moral motivation for giving in dictator games. According to the psychological theory of moral judgment, this motivation is not driven by outcomes but rather,
by an ethical assessment of the procedure. Subjects' shifts in beliefs about the task seem to merely have a cognitive, but no moral impact since transfers can be explained the same way, irrespectively of the variations we observe 15 . Neither in 'Give', nor in 'Take' games do moral preferences to fulfill others' expectations, or to comply with social norms explain dictators' transfers -which is the crucial feature of preferences models allowing for altruism.
Postconventional moral argumentation has already previously been studied in its relation to the rules of a game. In a setting of several procedures designed to produce the same (expected) outcomes, postconventional argumentation predicted whether or not individuals preferred certain procedural properties over others. Similarly, it increased buyers' offers in an auction whose rules were designed such that the seller had very little right of participation or information (Chlaß 2010) . This paper finds that the substantial body of evidence on giving in dictator games is linked to such outcome-invariant argumentation as well.
Description of the Experiment
In this experiment you interact with other participants whom you do not know. During the experiment, we will ask you to answer a number of questions.
Participants take on different roles

Your payoff
At the end of the experiment, the computer randomly chooses with equal probability one out of all rounds. You see which decision A made in that round. A's decision on how many ECUs she was to receive and on how many ECUs B was to receive in that round determines your overall payoff from the experiment.
During the experiment, your payoff will not be stated in Euros but in ECU (Experimental Currency Unit). The exchange rate of ECU to Euros is in every round:
1ECU=0.8Euros
Please be patient until all participants have read the instructions.
